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Abstract. Modern biology gives many casuistic descriptions of mutual infor-
mational interconnections between organisms. Semiotic and hermeneutic pro-
cesses in biosphere require a set of “sentient” community of players who optimize 
their living strategies to be able to stay in game. Perceptible surfaces of the 
animals, semantic organs, represent a special communicative interface that serves 
as an organ of self-representation of organic inwardness. This means that the 
innermost dimensions and potentialities of an organism may enter the senses of 
other living being when effectively expressed on the outermost surfaces of the 
former and meaningfully interpreted by the later. Moreover, semantic organs do 
not exist as objectively describable entities. They are always born via interpretative 
act and their actual form depends on both the potentialities of body plan of a 
bearer and the species-specific interpretation of a receiver. As such the semantic 
organs represent an important part of biological reality and thus deserve to be 
contextualized within existing comparative vocabulary. Here we argue that the 
study of the organic self-representation has a key importance for deeper insight 
into the evolution of communicative coupling among living beings.  
 
 
Karel Kleisner, Anton Markoš  300
1. Three models in biosemiotics 
 
The key word of our title is mutual; we maintain that for genuine 
biosemiotics it is necessary to develop a model of a biosphere of 
communicating semiotic entities. To highlight the task, we shortly 
describe three competing models, each in some context being labelled 
as “semiotic” by different authors (the boundaries between them being 
not clear-cut). 
1) At the level of organic codes (sensu Barbieri 2003) the task is a 
reliable translation from one coding system into another, according to 
a given (and finite) coding table. Hence, what is given beyond the 
physical system are rules obeyed by either a sentient being, or by a 
hardware of a sort. It follows that at this level, the quasi-semiotic pro-
cess does not require understanding, and no meaning is being 
extracted during the process. Examples of this level are: genetic code, 
signalling cascades, perhaps also the bacterial biosphere. Here belong 
all cybernetic networks. 
2) The second level concerns the understanding of signs in one’s 
umwelt. The being (animal) recognizes signs (Merkmale) in its 
environment and behaves accordingly. The paradigmatic example is 
the oak tree as given by Jakob von Uexküll (1956 — Fig. 1) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. An example of different interpretations of the same object “oak 
tree” in the umwelt of a forester and a scared girl. After Uexküll 1956. 
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The tree is perceived differently in various umwelten of different living 
beings (the forester, the girl, an occasional tramp, the insect inhabitants 
of the tree, etc.). The tree, however, has no say in how it will be present 
in those umwelten. It is passive in relation to them as, say, is a stone or a 
cloud. More precisely: as a stone or a cloud, it also can evoke meanings 
for all those beings, but without manifesting any interest from its side, 
neither investing any effort from its side to signify something.  
3) Finally, there is a level of sharing the common space and 
mutually and deliberately influencing other players of the game, by 
recognizing them as possible receivers of the message. Here belongs 
the concept of the biosphere as developed by S. Kauffman (2000), but 
above all, the concept of being-together (Mitsein) of Martin Heidegger 
(1995) as well as self-representation (Selbstdarstellung) by Adolf Port-
mann (1960b). Here, all living beings communicate actively with their 
cohabitants in the environment, and can display the whole scale of 
interactions, like orders, cheating, mutual warning, quorum sensing, 
mimicry, etc. What living beings communicate here is presentation 
and perception of likeness, i.e. gestalt of some cues by which the being 
gives itself to others, and the others will recognize it as such. We 
maintain that deep understanding of one’s partner(s) is a prerequisite 
of such phenomena. Here, we shall concentrate on this level of com-
municating meaning. 
 
2. Self-representation  
 
Adolf Portmann suggested that the visible surfaces of the living orga-
nisms represent a new kind of organs: organs that perform the self-
representation of the inwardness of organisms and interactions among 
organisms:   
 
Such a surface is not merely a ‘border’, not just a barrier for the 
containment of an inner milieu or for the safeguarding of metabolism, 
that is, for mechanical protection. No. This surface becomes an organ 
with entirely new potentialities. […] The surface display is a part of 
presentation of self of a living being. (Portmann 1990: 25) 
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Going along with this, the expression of pigment patterns and integu-
ment ornaments on the outermost surfaces are conceived as the non-
random and active achievement of a specific kind or lineage of 
organism. These, often intricately patterned organismal surfaces, bear 
a semantic role, and despite its superficial nature they are as important 
as other biologically adaptive structures. In the following text, we 
introduce the different types of outermost organization developed by 
living beings with special attention to the importance of surface 
ornaments of organisms for the mutual interplay between and within 
various life forms. Our subject here is constricted mainly to the 
instances that may enter the sight of a receiver (optic channel), but a 
similar way of reasoning may be easily extended also to other forms of 
perception as chemical, electrical, acoustic, tactile etc.  
Various shapes, patterns and colorations have evolved due to the 
possibility of being perceived by the other part, being recognized as a 
sign and interpreted within a specific context. In respect to this, 
appearances of different life forms may be divided into those having a 
primarily signalling role and those not having any signalling role, or 
they have gained such a role secondarily. For a good example of the 
latter consider the semi-transparent bodies of embryos or those of 
adult animals inhabiting the environments where the visual per-
ception is confined or disabled (e.g. troglobionts, pedobionts). It is 
highly probable that the evolutionary transition from non-specific 
semi-transparent bodies to sophistically structured opaque surfaces 
(or conversely to full transparency), like pigment patterns, physical 
colorations, and integumental ornaments covariates with the evolu-
tionary appearance of sight. This was an important evolutionary event 
that led to the increase of communicative abilities among organisms, 
in which the life got its face. 
In Portmannian perspective, an aptitude for mutual understanding 
sprouts from the very accent on selfhood of every individual living 
being. The importance of this self-relation is manifested by the vital 
processes of self-construction, self-maintenance, self-identification 
and, definitely, self-representation. Perhaps these features characterize 
every living being, and just these are lacking in inanimate nature. Self-
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representation of the inwardness of an organism, i.e. active presen-
tation of the self, in which the very innermost is expressed via the very 
outermost, represents the keystone of Portmann’s biological thought. 
This was aptly expressed R. B. Carter in his interpretative essay upon 
Portmann’s writings: “Thus whereas Galileo said, ‘Nature likes to hide’, 
Portmann saw that nature likes reveal, but that very revelation quite 
often hides precisely what it is which makes that revelation!” (Carter 
1990: 268).  
Basically, the mutual understanding among organisms depends on 
what is exposed, and thereby unproblematically perceivable, as well as 
on something deeply inner what cannot be unveiled in any simple way. 
In this sense, every mutual understanding is mediated, on the one 
hand via externalization of inwardness in a process of self-repre-
sentation, on the other hand via internalization of signals that fit 
meaningfully in the inwardness of a receiver; not quite dissimilar from 
empathy. The inwardness can never be fully discovered by the re-
searcher. However, it may be partially approached by the study of 
outermost expressions of organisms such as specifically featured 
appearances emerged in the process of self-representation. Therefore 
the only way to understand the innermost is to analyse the outermost. 
Portmann’s concept of inwardness (Innerlichkeit) may rightly re-
semble the Uexküll’s term Umwelt; both of these concepts stand for 
self-experience of an organism, i.e. for something what cannot be 
directly approached by a human observer. The realm of self-expe-
rience of organisms was considered by both Uexküll and Portmann as 
the most prominent target area of their biological research. 
 
 
3. Organs of self-representation  
(semantic organs; semes) 
 
When we conceive visible surfaces of organism to be organs of self-
representation it allows us to speak about these entities in the terms of 
homology and analogy. These two terms are crucial for every state-
ment in comparative biology which deals with some parts of greater 
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wholes, such as body parts, organs or even sequences (Ghiselin 2005). 
Therefore, to conceptualize the organs of self-representation within the 
context of analogy and homology may help us understand the mani-
fold diversity of organic surfaces in biological terms such as function, 
form, organization, phylogeny etc. Such a biological explanation is 
very important but still insufficient for the full understanding of these 
organs of self-representational meaning because their nature is not 
objective but interpretative. These organs are always dependent on the 
aptitude of the perceptual world (umwelt) of a receiver.  
In spite of all this, if we want to introduce these semantic organs to 
the comparative terms of homology and analogy we should first 
specify what we exactly mean by these semantic “organs”. In general, 
when we want to subject something to comparison, we should first 
know what it is to be compared. Therefore, some kind of definition of 
these semantic organs of self-representation is needed. But how these 
entities can be compared and even defined when we have already said 
that their performance may change according to the perceptual 
aptitudes of an interpreter? It is certainly an uneasy task because any 
rushed definition attempt may potentially lead to an inappropriate 
objectification. In what follows, we shall establish a preliminary defi-
nition of semantic organs in animals, using the optical examples, i.e. 
the semantic organs perceived by the visual interpreter. 
Animal surfaces represent additional organs or rather organ 
systems as real as the other organs or organ systems such as liver, 
lungs, pancreas, nervous system etc. This does not mean, however, 
that the properties of the inner anatomical and molecular constitution 
of an organism have no effect on its external display. Semantic organs 
are visible motifs of animal display that are partially dependent on 
both outer (skin, coat) and inner (skeleton, muscles) constitution of a 
body. As Portmann (1960a: 222) has aptly shown, also the colour of 
inner organ systems such as blood vessels and molecular qualities of 
haemoglobin (redness) may contribute to the external appearance of 
an animal. The organs of visible surfaces are rather co-structured by 
various constituents in the same way as the lungs, for example, are 
interlaced with nerves, blood vessels, integuments etc.  
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Semantic organs of visible surfaces function meaningfully if inter-
preted by the seeing eyes of an interpreter. We have already proposed 
to call such semantic organs of visible surfaces abbreviated as semes 
(Kleisner and Markoš 2005). Semes do not represent only the property 
of a specific morphological arrangement of certain species, but rather 
they arise in the process of interpretation by being watched by a 
second part. Semes are coming into being during an interpretative act, 
so they are generated and specified in dependence on the umwelt of an 
interpreter. Lastly, semes are shaped within the umwelt of an animal 
where they are recognized as existent and potentially meaningful. In 
summary, semes as organs of visible (or anyhow perceptible) organic 
surfaces are, on the one hand, physically anchored in the inherited 
organization of the body of a living being, but on the other hand, their 
high profile is achieved in the act of interpretation within the umwelt 
of an “seeing” organism. 
 
 
4. Mimicry and homosemiosis 
 
If self-representation is considered as a genuine and important cha-
racter of living beings, then acquiring, modification, or loss of species-
specific appearance means something non-trivial because these 
changes in the very outermost level inform us about the changed in-
wardness of an organism. For example, take numerous cases of 
mimicry where the appearance (and often also behaviour) of a model 
is imitated by one or more mimic species. In the case of Batesian 
mimicry, the model is somehow protected (unapalatability, hurtful 
weapons, poison etc.), whereas the mimics are usually lacking any 
protection. It is apparent that mimic organisms gain a selective 
advantage by adopting semes of a model. In this respect, we can talk 
about a kind of semetic parasitism. But this bright advantage in 
survival is necessarily connected with a less apparent disadvantage in 
the terms of self-representation. That is the loss of species specific 
semes what makes a payment for reproductional success. The self-
representation of mimics does not longer stand for the presentation of 
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the self, but it is the presentation of the semes of a model on the body of 
the mimic. In other words, bodies of the mimics serve as a projecting 
screen for the semes of the model. So, in fact, the display of a mimic 
represents the “self”- representation of the model.  
The signalling role of a particular organismal display (wasp-like 
pattern, for instance) influences not only the receivers, but also the 
bearer of such a warning sign is often “aware” about its aposematic 
vestment; irrespective of the fact as to whether we are talking about 
the model (wasp) or the mimic (fake wasp) such as various hoverflies, 
clearwing moths (Sesia), longhorn beetles (Clytus, Plagionotus, Stran-
galia) etc (Fig. 2).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Two unrelated species of insects with homosemiotic “wasp-like” 
pattern. Left: Longhorn beetle Strangalia maculata (Central Europe); 
Right: Grasshopper Phymateus saxosus (East Africa) 
 
 
The generation and use of warning coloration presupposes a certain 
kind “pre-understanding” by the bearer of the perceptual faculties 
(umwelt) of the signal receiver. A trained human researcher is able to 
distinguish model organisms from their non-allied imitators. He will 
also mark, for instance, the black and yellow pattern on the wing-cases 
of long horn beetles as analogous (nonhomologous) to the seemingly 
same pattern on the abdomen of the wasp — because of different 
phylogenetic and developmental origin of both patterns, despite all 
superficial similarity and congruence of warning function. Never-
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theless, it does not matter whether the wasp is really a real wasp from 
genus Vespulla, for instance, or an imitator from whatever group. It is 
important that both the real wasp and the fake wasp are interpreted as 
the same animal or the animal having the same meaning for a receiver 
(predator). In turn, a mimic relies on the fact that its appearance and 
behaviour will be interpreted by the receiver as enough wasp-like as 
necessary to avoid predation.  
We cannot say much about the inner character of this reliance, but 
there is a lot of evidence that, for example, the aposematically coloured 
animals have different modes of behaviour in comparison with the 
cryptic ones (see, for example, Maran 2007, Wickler 1968). We 
propose the term homosemiosis for situations when signals (semes) 
emitted by model and mimic organisms are taken as the same in the 
perceptual world (umwelt) of a receiver. Homosemiotic organs are 
neither analogous nor homologous. Analogy means the correspon-
dence in function (and similarity), but analogous organs are conceived 
as different organs (nonhomologous). Homology is the ontological 
sameness; homologous organs are the same organs because they are 
theoretically traceable to their precursor present in the immediate 
common ancestor, irrespective of the function and similarity. How-
ever, organs are homosemiotic, irrespective of the fact that they are 
analogues or homologoues in the eyes of a human biologist, because 
they are recognized as the same organs in umwelt of the interpreting 
organism.  
 
5. Conclusion remarks  
 
The self-representation of organisms is the generator of semblances 
(semes) that play an important role in the evolution of communicative 
coupling among and within species. Based on the presented discussion, 
we propose adding a biosemiotic perspective to the comparative 
biological terminology by introducing a new term homosemiosis (from 
Greek ‘homos’ = ‘same’, ‘semeion’ = ‘sign’); marking the phenomena 
where congruence of meaning appears (Kleisner 2008). The terms 
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analogy, homology and homosemiosis can be defined in the following 
way:  
(1)  Analogy: correspondence of different organs having the same 
function or being superficially similar.  
(2)  Homology: correspondence (sameness) of organs that are in-
herited from their precursor, present in the most recent common 
ancestor.  
(3)  Homosemiosis: correspondence of organs that are interpreted as 
the same organs in the umwelt of a particular organism or group 
of organisms under investigation (irrespective of the develop-
mental and phylogenetic origin of the organ).1  
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Взаимное (не)понимание в биологических системах  
на основе саморепрезентации организмов 
 
Современная биология предлагает несколько рафинированных опи-
саний информационных связей между организмами. Семиотические 
и герменевтические процессы в биосфере предполагают существо-
вание сообщества «чувствительных» членов, которые оптимизируют 
свои жизненные стратегии, чтобы остаться в игре. Перцептивные по-
верхности животных, семантические органы составляют специаль-
ный коммуникативный интерфейс, который действует как орган 
репрезентации органической внутренности организма.  Это означает, 
что  глубинные уровни и потенциалы организма доступны органам 
восприятия других живых существ в том случае, если внешние по-
верхности организма успешно их демонстрируют, и если прини-
мающий организм интерпретирует их как значимые. При этом 
семантические органы существуют в качестве объективно описы-
ваемых. Они возникают всегда в ходе интерпретации, и их реальная 
форма зависит как от возможностей телесного плана носителя, так и 
от видоспецифической интерпретации принимающего. В таком виде 
семантические органы составляют существенную область биоло-
гической реальности и достойны вовлечения в сферу современной 
терминологии. В статье утверждается, что изучение саморепрезента-
ции организмов имеет ключевое значение при глубинном пони-
мании эволюции коммуникативных связей между живыми орга-
низмами. 
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Vastastikune mõistmine ja vääritimõistmine bioloogilistes  
süsteemides organismide enese-esituslike tähenduste vahendusel 
 
Nüüdisaegne bioloogia pakub organismidevaheliste informatsiooniliste 
suhete kohta mitmeid rafineeritud kirjeldusi. Semiootilised ja herme-
neutilised protsessid biosfääris eeldavad “tundlike” osaliste kogukonna 
olemasolu, kes optimiseerivad oma elustrateegiaid, et mängus püsida. 
Loomade tajutavad pinnad, semantilised organid, moodustavad spetsiaal-
se kommunikatiivse liidese, mis toimib organismi orgaanilist sisemust 
representeeriva organina. See tähendab, et organismi kõige sisemised 
dimensioonid ja potentsiaalid võivad jõuda teiste elusolendite meeleelun-
ditesse, juhul kui organismi välimised pinnad esitavad neid tulemuslikult 
ja kui ka vastuvõtja interpreteerib neid tähenduslikult. Seejuures eksis-
teerivad semantilised organid objektiivselt kirjeldatavate nähtustena. Nad 
tekivad alati interpretatsiooni käigus ja nende tegelik vorm sõltub nii 
kandja kehaplaani võimalustest kui vastuvõtja liigispetsiifilisest interpre-
tatsioonist. Säärastena moodustavad semantilised organid olulise osa bio-
loogilisest reaalsusest ning väärivad seostamist nüüdisaegse termino-
loogiaga. Käesolevas artiklis väidame me, et organismide enese-esituse 
uurimine on võtmetähtsusega, et mõista sügavuti elusolendite kommuni-
katiivsete seosepaaride evolutsiooni. 
 
 
 
